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Real Property Forfeiture Under Federal




The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act pro-
vides for civil forfeiture of real property seized in connection with illegal
drug activity.' In an attempt to increase the penalties for felony drug
violations, Congress amended 21 U.S.C. § 881 as part of the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act of 1984.2 Section 881(a)(7) authorizes the forfei-
ture of real property "which is used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of," a felony
violation of the federal Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970.' By allowing for the forfeiture of houses and land connected with
drug felonies, section 881(a)(7) represents an attempt to further solidify
and strengthen drug forfeiture provisions.4
Congress intended section 881(a)(7) to be a strong deterrent mea-
sure, attacking the economic power bases out of which illegal drug opera-
tions were performed.- To date, courts have construed the statute
expansively, permitting forfeiture of real property used to facilitate a
drug felony whether or not the owner of the property was involved in the
commission of the felony.6 Under the current language of the statute,
the government can seize real property from a landowner due to a ten-
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. Sonoma State University, 1990.
1. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)(Supp.1991).
2. See, e.g., Charles B. Rangel, Reagan's Zero Tolerance Is a Zero Drug Policy, NEws-
DAY, June 28, 1988, at 66 (commenting on the effects of stronger drug penalties); 129 CONG.
REC. 5607 (1983) (commenting on the need to create more severe penalties for drug felony
violations) (remarks of Sen. Laxalt).
3. See Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat.
1236 (1970); 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (Supp. 1991).
4. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837
(1984); 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (Supp. 1991).
5. See 129 CONG. REC. 5607 (1983) (commenting on the victimization of the American
people due to drug violations, the need to stiffen drug penalties, and the importance of penaliz-
ing drug dealers financially) (remarks of Sen. Laxalt).
6. The issue of what constitutes facilitation is beyond the scope of this note. See infra
note 29 and accompanying text.
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ant's illegal activity even if the landowner did not participate in or know
of the illegal drug activity.7 Some courts have even construed the statute
to mean that a landowner has an affirmative duty to monitor the activi-
ties of a tenant or otherwise take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent
illicit use of the premises.8
Congress's hope seems to be that the harsh prospect of a real prop-
erty forfeiture will strongly deter the illegal drug trade.9 Unfortunately
for many landowners, real property forfeiture is a substantial and often
disproportionate remedy, especially where the underlying violation is rel-
atively minor or the landowner's involvement in the felony was relatively
limited. 1 Drug forfeitures also carry little constitutional protection.1"
Most importantly to this Note, proportionality analysis under the Eighth
Amendment, which might otherwise remedy some of the harsher effects
of drug forfeitures, is not available under current civil forfeiture laws.12
This Note proposes that the Disproportionate Punishments Clause
of the Eighth Amendment, or some other method of ensuring propor-
tionality between the severity of the transgression and the extent of the
penalty imposed, should apply in analyzing the application of section
881(a)(7) forfeiture provisions.
Part I provides a general background to the civil forfeiture provision
in section 881(a)(7). This Note first looks at the history behind civil for-
feiture provisions and examines the current procedure by which real
property is forfeited. It next examines constitutional protections which
have traditionally been afforded to those whose property has been for-
feited. Finally, it looks at the statutory innocent owner defense, which,
under limited circumstances, protects a landowner innocent of wrongdo-
ing from having his or her property forfeited.
Part II examines the application of proportionality standards to civil
statutes. It explores the possibility that a civil statute may actually be
punitive in nature with the result that a court must construe the civil
statute as a criminal statute. In such a case, the Eighth Amendment
proportionality standard would apply. Part II also examines the possibil-
ity of examining each forfeiture action on a case-by-case basis to see if the
forfeiture remedy exceeds reasonable governmental civil "damages"
caused by the civil violation. If so, the extent of the forfeiture which
7. See, e.g., United States v. 2011 Calumet, 699 F. Supp. 108 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
8. See, e.g., United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 1017 (1991); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90,
reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974).
9. See, e.g., 129 CONG. RFc. 5607 (1983) (arguing that forfeiture provisions "can cripple
and not merely wound" organizations dealing in illegal drugs) (remarks of Sen. Laxalt).
10. See, e.g., 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 881.
11. See infra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
12. Id; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII C". . . nor excessive fines imposed..
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exceeds the government's reasonable losses or "damages" would be sub-
ject to Eighth Amendment challenge.
Part III examines the potential for excessive or disproportionate
punishments which this statute has created. It provides examples of sub-
stantial, costly forfeitures which have come about as the result of rela-
tively minor transgressions or as the result of limited involvement in a
drug felony. This brief review will show that, as written and as applied,
section 881(a)(7) often results in disproportionate and excessive
punishments.
Part IV proposes that section 881(a)(7), though ostensibly civil, is so
punitive as to be criminal in nature. Thus, the Eighth Amendment
should in all cases apply to seizures of real property under this statute.
In the alternative, if the statute is to be construed as a civil statute, the
value and extent of the forfeiture must be limited to reasonable losses or
"damages" incurred by the government in enforcing the statute. To
avoid abuse where a tenant, and not a landowner, is the guilty party, this
Note proposes a "direct involvement" standard: unless a landowner is
directly involved in an applicable drug felony, his or her real property
may not be forfeited. This Note concludes that if section 881(a)(7) is so
construed, it will be a more effective and fair instrument in curbing drug
felonies.
I. Background
A. History of Civil Forfeiture
Civil forfeiture, though not common, is a fairly prevalent form of
forfeiture in American law.13 Essentially, it is a proceeding by which
property itself is accused of wrongdoing and is forfeited to the govern-
ment as a result." Unlike a criminal forfeiture proceeding, in which a
property owner's guilt is a prerequisite for the validity of a forfeiture,
civil forfeiture only requires that the property itself be associated with
the wrongdoing.15
Civil forfeiture dates back to Biblical times.16 It originates out of
pre-Judeo-Christian practices, 7 under the once commonly-held belief
that objects associated with proscribed activity can themselves be guilty
13. Other examples of civil forfeitures include 18 U.S.C. § 492 (Supp. 1991) (counterfeit-
ing paraphernalia); 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (Supp. 1991) (transportation of obscene materials for sale
or distribution); 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (Supp. 1991) (importation of obscene or immoral materials);
22 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. 1991) (illegal exportation of war materials).
14. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-82 (1974).
15. Id. at 683.
16. See Exodus 21:28 ("If an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, he shall be stoned:
and his flesh shall not be eaten.").
17. United States v. $39,000 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1218 n.4 (10th Cir.
1986).
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of wrongdoing."8 Historically, the "guilty" objects and not their owners
were parties to the in rem lawsuit. 9 The innocence of the owners was
uniformly rejected as a defense, unless constitutionally or statutorily pre-
scribed.2° Once an object was forfeited, title to that object would be
transferred to the Crown.21 Originally, English tradition dictated that
the money collected from the sale of the forfeited objects was to be used
for charitable purposes; the money was often used to pay for church
Masses.22 Over time, however, the value of seized objects was no longer
used for religious purposes and instead became a source of revenue for
the Crown.23
Although civil forfeiture has been called a "superstition" from the
"blind days" of feudalism, it has curiously gained favor in this country.24
As many as seventy years ago, in rem forfeiture was seen as a "worn out
fiction"25 derived from the "superstitious" belief that a physical object
has a power or personality capable of guilt.26 Today, in rem forfeiture is
used as a powerful method for attacking drug felony violations.27
B. Procedure by Which Real Property Is Forfeited Under Section
881(a)(7)
Section 881(a)(7) is designed to allow for the civil forfeiture of real
property used to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony viola-
tion of the federal narcotics laws.28 Under section 881(a)(7), seizure of
real property proceeds once the government has been able to prove that
the property was used to "facilitate" the violation of the narcotics law.29
Generally, both an exchange of a controlled substance and a substantial
connection between the property and the illegal activity are required
18. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 (1971).
19. $39,000 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d at 1218.
20. Id.; Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974).
21. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-81, 684.
22. Id. at 680-81.
23. Id. at 681.
24. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. at 720-21.
25. J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 506 (1921).
26. Id. at 510-11.
27. See, e.g., United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 1017 (1991).
28. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (Supp. 1991).
29. The issue of what constitutes "facilitation" is not always clear. Generally, courts re-
quire a "substantial connection" between the real property and the underlying narcotics viola-
tion, although some jurisdictions allow forfeiture when property is connected "in any manner"
with a drug felony. This is a significant topic, but is outside the scope of this Note. See Lalit
K. Loomba, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property Forfeiture under the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 471, 475 (1989); Steven S. Biss, Substantial
Connection and the Illusive Facilitation Element for Civil Forfeiture of Narcoband in Drug
Felony Cases, 25 U. RicH. L. REv. 171 (1990).
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before the civil forfeiture action may proceed.3°
Once the government proves that the property has facilitated a vio-
lation of federal drug laws, the burden then shifts to the landowner to
prove that the property is not subject to forfeiture.3" This often involves
invoking the innocent owner defense - that the landowner neither
"knew" nor "consented" to the illegal activity associated with the prop-
erty.3" If an affirmative defense cannot be proved, there is little that can
be done to reverse the forfeiture proceeding.33 The Attorney General
then has the power to sell the forfeited property, the proceeds of which
can be forwarded to various branches of the government.34
One additional incentive exists which encourages the government to
implement drug forfeiture laws. Under a related subsection, section
88 1(e), state and local law enforcement agencies involved in the seizures
of real and other property are allowed to keep some of the forfeited prop-
erty's proceeds once the property has been sold.35 The value of the pro-
ceeds must bear "a reasonable relationship to the degree of direct
participation of the state or local agency in the law enforcement effort
resulting in the forfeiture .... -13 Thus, in addition to its punitive as-
pects, section 881 as currently written provides state and local law en-
forcement agencies a strong economic incentive to initiate civil forfeiture
proceedings whenever possible.37
C. Constitutional Protections and Other Limits to Civil Forfeiture Laws
Unlike criminal forfeiture proceedings, civil forfeiture proceedings
afford property owners only limited constitutional protection.38 The
30. United States v. 2639 Meetinghouse Rd., 633 F. Supp. 979, 986 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
31. See, e.g., United States v. $39,000 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1216-17
(10th Cir. 1986).
32. Section 881(a)(7) states that "no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph...
by reason of any act or omission... committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent
of" the owner of the property. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (Supp. 1991). See infra notes 56-76 and
accompanying text.
33. One can appeal to the Attorney General for "remission." The Attorney General may
return the property if he finds the penalty excessively harsh or if there are mitigating circum-
stances to justify remission. See United States v. One 1976 Porsche 91 IS, 670 F.2d 810, 813
(9th Cir. 1979).
34. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (Supp. 1991).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (Supp. 1991).
36. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(3)(A) (Supp. 1991).
37. In 1986, federal agents seized assets totalling about $360 million. See Battle Strate-
gies; Five Fronts in a War of Attrition, TIME, September 15, 1986, 69, 71.
38. Most constitutional protections provided to a criminal defendant do not apply here,
since it is technically the property, not the alleged perpetrator of a crime, that is the defendant.
See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984) (the double
jeopardy clause does not apply to civil forfeiture); United States v. $250,000 in United States
Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 900 (1st Cir. 1987) (because of its civil nature, section 881 does not
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a criminal violation occurred); United States v.
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strictness of civil forfeiture laws has led to numerous constitutional at-
tacks, most of which have enjoyed only limited success. 39 An action
under section 881(a)(7) does not entitle a landowner to the stricter con-
stitutional protections of a criminal statute.' Some constitutional pro-
tections, however, still apply.
Fourth Amendment procedural limitations against unreasonable
searches and seizures apply to civil forfeiture statutes.41 The role of the
Fourth Amendment has been a limited one, however, due to the Supreme
Court's adoption of the Fuentes v. Shevin doctrine to drug forfeiture
cases.4' Fuentes v. Shevin established that property forfeiture without a
pre-forfeiture hearing is permissible in the presence of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest.43 In civil forfeiture cases, the elimination of the drug
trade has been held a compelling interest thereby justifying pre-hearing
seizures of property.44
Civil forfeiture statutes trigger limited Fifth Amendment protection
as well. They are subject to the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause, allowing a landowner to refuse to reveal information which
might lead to property forfeiture. 45 An appellate court has further held
that these statutes are subject to the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, protecting against arbitrary or harsh government action.46 The
justification for applying Fifth Amendment protection is that forfeiture
laws are "quasi-criminal" in nature.4 7 Attacks on forfeiture statutes
under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, however, have been regu-
larly defeated.48
$5,644,540 in United States Currency, 799 F.2d 1357, 1364 n.8 (9th Cir. 1986) (because of its
civil nature, section 881 is not subject to the ex post facto clause); United States v. 141st St.
Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1990), cerL denied, 111 S.Ct. 1017 (1991) (because of its
civil nature, the Eighth Amendment does not apply to section 881); United States v. 2639
Meetinghouse Rd., 633 F. Supp. 979, 993 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (Article III, Section 3, Clause 2 of
the U.S. Constitution [provision against forfeitures to the government] does not apply to civil
forfeitures).
39. The argument "that civil forfeiture actions are essentially criminal and must be gov-
erned by all of the rules which adhere to criminal prosecution... has enjoyed only qualified
success." Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069
(1974).
40. See, e.g, United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 880 (2d Cir. 1990).
41. See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Penn., 380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965).
42. The court adopted the Fuentes test in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663, 678 (1974). See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
43. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91-92.
44. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678-79.
45. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886); United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas,
Inc., 829 F.2d 532, 540-41 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 976 (1988).
46. United States. v. One Tintoretto Painting, 691 F.2d 603, 608 (2d Cir. 1982).
47. See, e.g., Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634.
48. The Takings Clause argument has been addressed elsewhere by the Supreme Court,
and a discussion pertaining to it is beyond the scope of this Note. See United States v. United
States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1970).
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The Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process requirements
are also met under the Fuentes v. Shevin test. 9 As mentioned earlier, the
Supreme Court has concluded that drug-related civil forfeitures arise out
of "extraordinary" situations, which justify postponement of pre-seizure
notice and hearing.50 Thus, the Supreme Court has concluded that civil
forfeiture proceedings do not violate due process rights.51
In addition to the more relaxed constitutional standards afforded to
civil forfeiture laws, evidentiary standards in civil cases provide less pro-
tection than those in criminal cases. The initiation of forfeiture proceed-
ings under 21 U.S.C. § 881 requires only a showing of probable cause,1
2
not, as would be true in a criminal case, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Also, because in rem actions are instituted against the property
itself, not against the owner of the property, the landowner's guilt is not a
necessary prerequisite for the property seizure.5" Theoretically, cases
might arise in which the criminal forfeiture proceeding fails for lack of
evidence but the civil proceeding succeeds. 4 And once the government
has put forward a valid, prima facie case for forfeiture, the burden of
proof shifts to the landowner to prove that he or she is innocent.5
D. The Statutory Innocent Owner Defense
Section 881(a)(7) contains a statutory innocent owner defense that
prohibits government seizures of real property where the illegal drug ac-
tivity was committed "without the knowledge or consent" of the prop-
erty owner.5 6 Prior to 1984, the only innocent owner defense available in
civil forfeiture actions was the "constitutional" innocent owner defense.
5 7
This defense required not only that a property owner was "[1]
uninvolved in and [2] unaware of the wrongful activity, but also, [3] that
he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the pro-
49. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 678 (1974) (quoting Fuen-
tes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972)).
50. Id. at 679-80.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas, Inc., 829 F.2d 532, 544 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 976 (1988).
53. See, e.g., Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 1974); D.K.G. Ap-
paloosas, Inc., 829 F.2d at 543-44.
54. The criminal forfeiture statute relating to violations of the federal narcotics laws is 21
U.S.C. § 853 (Supp. 1991). The relevant evidentiary and constitutional standards for criminal
proceedings apply to this statute, which might account for its lower popularity with prosecu-
tors. Interestingly, federal law enforcement agencies can bring actions simultaneously against
the same property under the criminal statute, section 853, and the civil statute, section 881. In
such cases, the double jeopardy clause does not apply. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,
399 (1938).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand (Dollars),
762 F.2d 895, 906-07 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986).
56. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (Supp. 1991).
57. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974).
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scribed use of his property... ."' Under this test, property owners had
an affirmative duty to prevent illegal use of their property.
As currently written, the section 881(a)(7) statutory defense appears
easier to mount. The statute bars forfeiture if the felony violation occurs
"without the knowledge or consent" of the property owner.5 9 Unfortu-
nately, this standard is difficult to interpret or, as one court stated, "at
best, confusing."'
Two problem areas are most troubling. First, it is unclear whether
lack of either knowledge or consent, or lack of both, is required under the
defense. Section 881(a)(7) simply states that the defense applies where
the felony occurred "without the knowledge or consent of that owner,"'"
thereby arguably supporting either interpretation. Matters are further
complicated by the fact that knowledge is generally a prerequisite for
consent.62 Thus, the disjunctive interpretation, that either lack of knowl-
edge or lack of consent will satisfy the defense, generally reduces itself to
a lack of consent requirement.63
There are two interpretations with respect to this defense which
courts have followed. Some jurisdictions require that the owner neither
knew nor consented to the illegal activity." Other jurisdictions allow the
disjunctive interpretation, which ultimately requires only a showing of
lack of consent.65
A second problem related to the ambiguity of the innocent owner
defense is apparent in the various interpretations of "knowledge" and
"consent." Some jurisdictions interpret "knowledge" as "actual knowl-
edge," or what the innocent owner actually was aware of at the time of
58. Id. at 689.
59. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (Supp. 1991).
60. United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S.Ct. 1017 (1991).
61. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (Supp. 1991).
62. This assumes, fairly reasonably, that knowledge would generally predate consent. A
landowner might assert, "I knew, but I didn't consent." On the other hand, an assertion that
"I didn't know, but I consented," would be rare in most cases.
63. Some writers have concluded that either lack of knowledge or lack of consent should
be sufficient to satisfy the defense. See Lalit K. Loomba, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real
Property Forfeiture Under The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 58 FORDHAM L.
REV. 471, 478-86 (1989). A problem with this construction is, if the disjunctive interpretation
generally reduces to "lack of consent," then there would be no reason for Congress to include
the reference to "lack of knowledge." At the same time, however, the opposite interpretation,
showing that both lack of knowledge and lack of consent are necessary, generally reduces itself
to a lack of knowledge standard. See infra note 62. Again, it is difficult to understand what
Congress's intention is from the language of the statute alone. The adopted standard now
varies among jurisdictions. See infra notes 64 and 65 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., United States v. 124 East North Ave., 651 F. Supp. 1350, 1357 (N.D. Ill.
1987). Logically, this is the same as requiring only lack of knowledge.
65. See, e.g., United States v. 171-02 Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. 46, 49-50 (E.D.N.Y.
1989); 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878.
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the illegal drug activity." Other jurisdictions have used a "constructive
knowledge" standard, based upon what the landowner "should have
known" at the time of the illegal activity. If the landowner "should have
known" that the property was being used for illegal purposes, then the
innocent owner defense is unavailable.67
Elements that courts have held to constitute constructive knowledge
include knowledge that a tenant has used drugs previously or knowledge
that the area where the property is located has a reputation for large
amounts of drug activity.6" Some courts have also used inferences to
impute knowledge if it seems likely that the property owner knew of the
illegal activity.69 Thus, in some jurisdictions, if an owner has failed to
meet a reasonable person standard with respect to knowledge, then, even
if the landowner had no actual knowledge, that landowner's entire prop-
erty may be forfeited.70
Courts have also used two different interpretations of "consent."
Consent may be interpreted as "actual consent," meaning that a land-
owner affirmatively agreed to allow the tenants to commit drug felo-
nies.71 Other courts have interpreted consent to include a broader
concept of "constructive consent."72 An owner constructively consents
when he or she fails to do all that reasonably can be expected in prevent-
ing a tenant from engaging in illegal drug activity on the landowner's
property.73 In the Second Circuit, for example, once a landowner is put
on notice that there may be drug felony violations on his or her property,
that landowner is under a duty to prevent the violations from
occurring. 74
66. See, e.g., United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand (Dollars),
762 F.2d 895, 907 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. 2901 S.W. 118th Court, 683 F. Supp. 783,
788 (S.D. Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand (Dollars),
762 F.2d 895, 906 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986) (no constructive knowl-
edge standard, but allowed factual inferences whether, under the circumstances, the owner was
aware of the illegality); United States v. 2011 Calumet, 699 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D. Tex. 1988)
(owner had no reason to know that property was being used illegally).
68. See, e.g., United States v. 5745 N.W. 110 Street, 721 F. Supp. 287 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
69. See, eg., United States v. One 1983 Pontiac Gran Prix, 604 F. Supp. 893, 897 (E.D.
Mich. 1985).
70. See 2011 Calumet, 699 F. Supp. at 110.
71. See, e.g., United States v. 171-02 Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. 46, 50-52 (E.D.N.Y.
1989); United States v. Certain Real Property, 724 F. Supp. 908, 916 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
72. See, eg., 2011 Calumet, 699 F. Supp. at 108; United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911
F.2d 870, 876 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991); United States v. 11885 S.W.
46th St., 715 F. Supp. 355, 358 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
73. 2011 Calumet, 699 F. Supp. at 110. This is simply a reworking of the older Calero-
Toledo constitutional innocent owner defense. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 690 (1974).
74. See, e.g., 141st SL Corp., 911 F.2d at 879. This standard was also applied in 2011
Calumet, 699 F. Supp. at 110.
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What a landowner can reasonably be expected to do to prevent drug
use once put on notice is subject to some dispute.7 5 Still, many courts do
not appear troubled that the drastic step of real property forfeiture can
result from failure to comply with a vaguely defined affirmative duty. 6
The harshness of the forfeiture provision and the excessive penalties im-
posed as the result of what in many cases is limited wrongdoing are
problems which this Note addresses in the following sections.
II. Disproportionality Analyses of Section 881(A)(7)
A. Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis
1. Section 881(a)(7): Civil or Criminal?
"The peculiar nature of forfeiture statutes ... has given rise to nu-
merous constitutional attacks."'77 Claimants whose property has been
forfeited have consistently argued that forfeiture actions are essentially
criminal and must be subject to important constitutional protections
such as the Eighth Amendment. 78 Courts have consistently held, how-
ever, that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to civil statutes such as
section 881(a)(7).79
In order for the Eighth Amendment to apply to a civil statute, the
statute must be construed by the court as criminal in nature. In Helver-
ing v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court held that a civil sanction intended as
"punishment" is essentially criminal in nature."0 Over time, the Supreme
Court refined this standard, creating a seven-step test in Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).s1 This test essentially examines the
75. See, e.g., 171-02 Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. at 51. The landowner owned a building in
a "war zone" neighborhood that was one of the largest crack houses in New York. The land-
owner refused to "fully cooperate" with police, although he did allow them to destroy steel
doors and barricades erected on the property by the drug dealers. Id. Cooperation with the
police was perceived as dangerous in the neighborhood; tenants had automatic weapons and
firepower greater than that of the police. Id.
76. See, e.g., 2011 Calumet, 699 F. Supp. at 110 ("A landlord cannot escape accountabil-
ity to the community ... by refusing to investigate suspicious facts and allegations of illegal
use.").
77. Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069
(1974).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., United States v. 300 Cove Rd., 861 F.2d 232, 233-35 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989); United States v. 26.075 Acres, 687 F. Supp. 1005, 1013 (E.D.N.C.
1988), modified, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. One 1985 BMW 635 CSI, 677
F. Supp. 1039, 1041 (C.D. Cal. 1987). See also Ingraham v. White, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977)
(Eighth Amendment applies only to those convicted of crimes).
80. Helvering, 303 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1938).
81. Under the Mendoza test, the intention of Congress is considered a primary factor.
Mendoza, 372 U.S. at 168-69. If Congress intended the statute to be civil, a seven-step analysis
is used to determine whether Congress's intention should be overridden. Id. Courts still con-
sider the seven-step Mendoza analysis as a source of supplementary guidelines. See, e.g.,
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civil remedy to determine if it is criminal in nature or essentially
punitive.
8 2
In 1980, the Supreme Court simplified the civil/criminal test in
United States v. Ward. 3 Ward established a two-step test that deter-
mines whether a statute intended to be civil is in fact criminal.84 First,
the court examines the statute carefully to determine whether Congress
expressly or impliedly indicated whether the statute was intended as a
civil statute.8 5 Second, if the court finds the "clearest proof" that the
statutory scheme is so punitive as to override Congress's intention, then
the statute will be construed as a criminal statute.8 6 The court is also free
to use the seven factors of Mendoza to support an assertion of excessive
punitiveness.8 7
2. Underlying Punitiveness of Section 881(a)(7) Remedy
Whether the Eighth Amendment applies to section 881(a)(7) de-
pends, again, upon whether the statute is construed as civil or criminal.
As we have seen, a determination that a statute is criminal results when
that statute is held to be essentially punitive in nature.8 8 In prior cases,
courts have consistently concluded that section 881(a)(7) is not so puni-
tive as to be considered a criminal statute and thereby subject to the
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365 (1984). See also, United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 916 (1980).
The seven-step analysis is as follows:
1) Does the sanction involve an affirmative disability or restraint?
2) Is the sanction historically regarded as a punishment?
3) Does the statute come into play only on a finding of scienter?
4) Does the statute's operation promote the traditional aims of punishment?
5) Is the behavior to which the statute applies already a crime?
6) Is there an alternate purpose to which the statute may rationally be connected?
7) Does the statute appear excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned?
Mendoza, 372 U.S. 168-69.
The fifth guideline in Mendoza is probably met in that the behavior section 881(a)(7) seeks
to address is already a crime. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) relates to felony violations of federal
narcotics laws punishable by more than one year in jail and thus applies to behavior which is
already a crime. The second Mendoza guideline, the underlying punitiveness of the statute, is
by far the most important inquiry and will be analyzed under the analysis of United States v.
Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980). See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
82. Mendoza, 372 U.S. at 167.
83. Ward, 448 U.S. 242.
84. Id. at 248-49.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Ward, 448 U.S. at 249; United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465
U.S. 354, 365 (1984). See supra notes 81-82.
88. Some courts look only at the intention of Congress and at the punitiveness of the
statutory scheme in considering whether a statute should be deemed criminal. See, e.g., United
States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543 (4th Cir. 1989).
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Eighth Amendment. 9 For example, an appellate court called the statute
"primarily remedial," with a primary purpose not to punish, but to "at-
tack... the economic power bases of criminal organizations."90 Other
courts have qualified civil forfeiture as having only "collateral and inci-
dental punitive effect."9 Many courts justify civil forfeitures as liqui-
dated damages owed to society,92 or as compensation for losses incurred
by the government.
93
At the same time, other courts have implicitly acknowledged the
underlying punitiveness of section 881(a)(7). The United States Supreme
Court once noted that the civil forfeiture statute's "penalties" are a valu-
able deterrent device.94 It has also stated that punitive damages awarded
to the government in a civil action may raise Eighth Amendment con-
cerns. 95 The Court has also acknowledged the similarity between
"forfeiting" property and paying a criminal fine.96 Despite these state-
ments, the Supreme Court still has not granted proportionality review to
civil forfeitures.
Among appellate courts, the Second Circuit has held that forfeitures
overwhelmingly disproportionate to the value of the offense must be clas-
sified as punishment unless the forfeitures serve legitimate civil pur-
poses.9 7 The Third Circuit has acknowledged that "reasonable minds
might disagree" as to whether section 881(a)(7) is not in fact so punitive
as to qualify for Eighth Amendment protection.98 The Fourth Circuit
has stated that the "punitive aspects of any forfeiture are self-evident."99
The Seventh Circuit has categorized the statute as a "harsh punishment
for those who sell illegal drugs."" °  The Eighth Circuit has admitted that
89. See, e.g., United States v. Premises Known As 2639 Meetinghouse Rd., Jameson,
Pennsylvania, 633 F. Supp. 979, 994 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
90. United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas, Inc., 829 F.2d 532, 544-45 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 976 (1988).
91. See, e.g., United States v. 26.075 Acres, 687 F. Supp. 1005, 1013 (E.D.N.C. 1988),
modified, 866 F.2d 1583 (4th Cir. 1989) (section 881(a)(7) is not punitive, but serves "broad,
remedial, non-punitive purposes... to strip the drug trade of its instrumentalities of crime.").
92. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254 (1980); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 148, 151 (1956).
93. See, e.g., United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. 173, 180 (E.D.N.Y.
1990), afl'd, 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
94. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974). "[mhe Pu-
erto Rican [civil] forfeiture statutes further the punitive and deterrent purposes... by impos-
ing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable." Id. at 686-87.
95. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 n.21 (1989).
96. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971).
97. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29 at 35. This is the only appellate court which has
held that proportionality review applies to section 881(a)(7) forfeitures. Id. at 36.
98. United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land Located in Warren Township, 898
F.2d 396, 401 (3rd. Cir. 1990).
99. United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543 (4th Cir. 1989).
100. United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 1090 (1991).
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"[i]n this case it does appear that the government is exacting too high a
penalty in relation to the [section 881(a)(7) offense] committed."101
However, all but one of these courts have refused to apply any kind of
proportionality standard to civil forfeitures.
A New York district court noted that "forfeiture is a penalty with-
out clear limits" and that "[t]he value of the property is not inevitably
related to the harmfulness of the use to which it is put."102 The same
court found that civil forfeitures "usually" are punitive in purpose and
effect.10 3 It suggested that the Eighth Amendment may indeed be appli-
cable to all cases where the government attempts to punish an individual
if the punishment goes beyond serving any compensatory or remedial
interest. 04
In criminal forfeiture cases, the Eighth Amendment has certainly
been raised as a concern. For instance, in one criminal forfeiture pro-
ceeding, an appellate court found that there was great potential for exces-
sively harsh penalties because courts do not have discretion to exclude
part of the propert3, from forfeiture. 105 Because of this, the court called
the criminal forfeiture statute "literally without limitation" and capable
of "exceed[ing] constitutional bounds in any particular case."' 6 The
court then held that an Eighth Amendment proportionality standard'0 7
should be applied in criminal forfeiture cases where an excessive punish-
ment may have been imposed. 108 There seems little reason to grant pro-
portionality review to criminal forfeitures and not to civil forfeitures
when both provisions are roughly equivalent in purpose and effect.' 0 9
B. Case-By-Case Proportionality Analysis
Rather than finding that section 881(a)(7) should be construed as a
crimihal provision in all cases, thereby subjecting civil forfeitures to
Eighth Amendment protection, some courts have called for a proportion-
101. United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 1992).
102. United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. 173, 181 (E.D.N.Y. 1990),
affid, 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
103. Id. at 179-81.
104. Id.
105. United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir. 1987) (defendant charged
under RICO's criminal forfeiture provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)).
106. Id.
107. In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983), the Supreme Court provided stan-
dards for determining whether a punishment was disproportionate under the Eighth Amend-
ment. See infra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.
108. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1415.
109. "[I]t appears incongruous to 'require proportionality review for forfeitures when the
government proceeds in personem [i.e., under criminal forfeiture provisions], but not when the
government proceeds in rem [i.e., under civil forfeiture provisions]."' United States v. 508
Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 817-18 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. 300 Cove Rd., 861
F.2d 232, 234 (9th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989)).
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ality review of civil forfeitures on a case-by-case basis.' 10 If this view
were implemented, section 88 1(a)(7) would still be considered a civil pro-
vision, but the value of any potential forfeitures would be limited by a
proportionality standard.
For the purpose of determining whether the Double Jeopardy
Clause has been violated, the Supreme Court has recently recommended
examining civil penalties on a case-by-case basis to determine if the pen-
alty exceeds that which would reasonably be expected of a civil remedy.
In United States v. Halper, the Court stated that when the civil penalty
sought bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the govern-
ment for its loss, it should instead be considered a criminal punish-
ment. 111 The Court held that a civil penalty should be imposed only to
the extent by which it compensates the government for its losses." 2 Any
amount which serves purposes of "retribution and deterrence," the tradi-
tional goals of punishment, would be considered a criminal punish-
ment" 3 and not a legitimate civil penalty.114 The Court also determined
that such a quasi-punitive civil statute entitles a defendant to an "ac-
counting of the government's damages and costs.""' 5
The Second Circuit, in United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, has
held that Halper should apply to civil forfeitures." 6 Forfeitures that are
overwhelmingly disproportionate to the value of the offense are classified
as punishment in the Second Circuit's analysis "unless the forfeitures are
shown to serve articulated, legitimate civil purposes.""' 7 Following
Halper, the 38 Whalers Cove court said it must look to the forfeiture
remedy, on a case-by-case basis, to "examine whether the forfeiture at
hand is fully justified by the civil and remedial purposes it ostensibly
serves, or whether it or a portion thereof can be explained only with
reference to punitive goals.""' 8 If even a "portion" of the forfeiture were
punitive in nature, that portion would be a disproportionate penalty in
violation of the Eighth Amendment." 9
110. See infra notes 111-123 and accompanying text.
111. 490 U.S. 435, 446-50 (1989). The district court had previously determined that, be-
cause the recovery of $130,000 bore no "rational relation" to the government's actual damages
of $585, it violated the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy clause. United States v. Halper,
660 F. Supp. 531, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
112. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
113. Id. at 448.
114. See United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. 173, 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)
("Retribution and deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives.").
115. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
116. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1992), affig 747 F. Supp. 173
(E.D.N.Y. 1990). See also Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
117. Id
118. Id. at 36.
119. Id. at 36-38.
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The 38 Whalers Cove court thus recommended a bifurcated ap-
proach to proportionality analysis of civil forfeitures. It granted civil
treatment of the forfeited property, to the extent of the value of the
drugs,"' any "damages" caused to the government by the transgres-
sion, 121 or, alternatively, the government's reasonable costs of enforcing
the provision. 122 Where the value of seized property is overwhelmingly
disproportionate to the value of the drugs involved in the transgression,
however, the Second Circuit will presume that the forfeiture is punitive
in nature. 123
As of this writing, the Second Circuit is the only court which has
called for proportionality review of civil forfeitures. Other appellate
courts, such as the First Circuit,124 the Third Circuit, 125 the Fourth Cir-
cuit, 126 and the Ninth Circuit, 127 have expressly stated that proportional-
ity review is not applicable to section 881(a)(7). The Eighth Circuit,
though not expressly holding that proportionality review applies to civil
forfeitures, issued a strongly-worded opinion favoring that interpreta-
tion. 128 It remains to be seen whether other appellate courts, or the
Supreme Court itself, will adopt such an interpretation.
III. Examining Section 881(A)(7) Forfeitures for
Disproportionality
A. Proportionality Analyses Applicable to Section 881(a)(7)
As stated in the previous section, there are two types of proportion-
ality analysis which may apply to section 881(a)(7) forfeitures: the
Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis, and the case-by-case analy-
sis recommended by Halper and 38 Whalers Cove.
Solem v. Helm governs an Eighth Amendment proportionality anal-
ysis. 129 Under Solem, three factors determine whether a punishment is
120. The court recommends using the value of the drugs as a "rough measuring stick." Id.
at 36.
121. Id. at 37.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 36.
124. See, eg., United States v. Plat 20, Lot 17, Great Harbor Neck, 960 F.2d 200 (1st Cir.
1992).
125. United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel Located in Warren Township, 898 F.2d 396,
400-01 (3rd Cir. 1990).
126. United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (4th. Cir. 1989).
127. United States v. 300 Cove Rd., 861 F.2d 232, 233-35 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 954 (1989).
128. "We sincerely hope Congress re-examines § 881 and considers injecting some sort of
proportionality requirement into the statute, even though the Constitution does not mandate
such a result." United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 1992).
129. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
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disproportionate.13 0 The first factor compares the harshness of the pen-
alty to the gravity of the offense.13 1 The second factor assesses the
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction.13 2 The
third factor compares the sentences imposed on those convicted of the
same crime in other jurisdictions. 133 Under both the second and third
factors, "a lesser included offense should not be punished more severely
than a greater offense."'
134
The second approach to analysis is the case-by-case proportionality
review recommended by Halper and 38 Whalers Cove.'15 The 38 Whal-
ers Cove court recommended that the government give an accounting of
its actual losses or damages where the value of the forfeited object ap-
pears to exceed any remedial (i.e., civil) purpose.136 The government
may use either its reasonable costs or "overhead" involved in enforcing
the provision 137 or the value of the drugs involved in the underlying
transaction 38 as a "rough measuring stick" in determining the extent of
the forfeiture which may be permitted. 139 Where the government fails to
show that its costs justify such a penalty, 38 Whalers Cove concluded,
courts should decline to enforce the forfeiture."4
Though both types of proportionality analysis must proceed on a
case-by-case basis, section 881(a)(7) has produced many forfeitures
which are profoundly disproportionate both to the extent of the perpetra-
tor's wrongdoing and to the degree of involvement by the landowner. As
the following sections will suggest, numerous disproportionate punish-
ments have occurred and will continue to occur unless some type of pro-
portionality standard is inserted into the interpretation of section 881.
B. Value of Penalty Exceeds Severity of Transgression
With section 881(a)(7) forfeitures, the value of the penalty, which is
the value of the object forfeited to the government, often greatly exceeds
the value of the drugs seized, or the severity of the transgression. For
example, a house and surrounding acreage valued at $94,810 was for-
feited when marijuana plants valued at less than $1000 were found on the
130. Id. at 290-95.
131. Id. at 291.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id at 293.
135. See supra notes 111-123 and accompanying text.
136. United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. 173, 179-181 (E.D.N.Y. 1990),
affd, 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
137. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d at 37.
138. Id. at 36.
139. Id.
140. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp at 180.
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property.1 41 In another case, a condominium worth $60,000 was for-
feited when less than 2.5 grams of cocaine was found in it.142 The co-
caine had a street value of approximately $250.143 A property worth
over $100,000 was forfeited for the sale of approximately two grams of
cocaine and two grams of marijuana on the defendant property. 1"
Under the present interpretation of section 881(a)(7), courts will enforce
the forfeiture remedy regardless of the value of the forfeited property or
the extent of the transgression.
C. No Correlation Between Amount of Property Seized and Amount of
Property Used to Facilitate Drug Felony
Another kind of disproportionality exists when an entire lot of real
property is seized, even though only a small part of the property was
used to commit the drug felony offense. In one case, a house and an
entire parcel of land was seized, even though only a small section of it
was used to grow marijuana. 145 Another case involving a small plot of
marijuana resulted in the forfeiture of 100 acres.14 6 An entire 30-acre
tract was forfeited when only the house, driveway, and swimming pool
were used to commit a drug felony.14 7 Two cases document an entire
house and its adjoining land being forfeited when a drug felony occurred
in the driveway.148 Although the government claims civil forfeitures are
"remedial" in nature and serve to strip the drug trade of its "instrumen-
talities" of crime,1 49 the government's appetite for forfeited property
often seems limitless.
D. Forfeiture Where Landowner Is Not Directly Involved in Drug
Felony
The punishment under section 881(a)(7) is often excessively harsh to
innocent owners whose property is seized as a result of their tenants'
wrongdoing. For example, a six-story, forty-one unit apartment building
was forfeited because a series of drug felonies were committed by the
141. United States v. 300 Cove Rd., 861 F.2d 232, 233 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 954 (1989).
142. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. at 174.
143. Id.
144. United States v. 26.075 Acres, 687 F. Supp. 1005, 1008, 1009 (E.D.N.C. 1988), modi-
fied, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989).
145. 300 Cove Rd., 861 F.2d at 235.
146. United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land Located in Warren Township, 898
F.2d 396 (3rd Cir. 1990).
147. United States v. Reynolds, 856 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1988).
148. United States v. 3097 S.W. 111th Ave., 921 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1991); United States
v. 31 N.W. 136th Court, 711 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
149. See, e.g., United States v. 26.075 Acres, 687 F. Supp. 1005, 1013 (E.D.N.C. 1988),
modified, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989).
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tenants.150 The landowner's "innocent owner" defense was rejected be-
cause he failed to respond to repeated complaints by the police.15' In
another case, a five-story brick apartment building was seized when two
of the tenants had engaged in drug felony violations.1 52 Another case of
drug use by a tenant resulted in the forfeiture of an entire building even
though the landowner had no actual knowledge that the tenants were
committing drug felony violations.'53 Thus, even where a landowner has
no direct involvement in the underlying drug felonies, courts have held
that section 881(a)(7) authorizes forfeiture of the landowner's property.
E. Other Problems With Proportionality and Section 881(a)(7)
The basic structure by which section 88 l(a)(7) forfeitures occur con-
founds reasonable notions of proportionality. Under Solem v. Helm, a
lesser offense should not be punished more severely than a greater of-
fense. 154 With section 881(a)(7) real property forfeitures, an innocent
landowner can often be punished more severely than a tenant for the
tenant's illegal activities. Indeed, because of its lower evidentiary re-
quirements, cases whose proof might not permit a criminal conviction of
the tenant could in fact support a civil forfeiture proceeding against the
landlord. 55 Additionally, no trial on damages is granted with civil for-
feiture actions; the punishment is automatically equal to the value of the
property. Thus, the punishment is not determined by the seriousness of
the illegal drug activity or the landowner's culpability, but is simply de-
termined by the value of the property.
1 56
IV. Proposal
A. Subject Section 881(a)(7) to the Eighth Amendment
Although Congress expressly intended section 881(a)(7) to be a civil
forfeiture provision, it is sufficiently punitive to negate Congress's inten-
tion. Section 881(a)(7), particularly as it applies to innocent landowners,
is essentially punitive in nature. Its remedies are often excessive and bear
no relationship to the degree or extent of the wrongdoing being ad-
dressed. Also, section 881(a)(7) addresses actions which are essentially
150. United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111
S.Ct. 1017 (1991).
151. Id. at 877-80.
152. United States v. 16 Clinton St., 730 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
153. United States v. 2011 Calumet, 699 F. Supp. 108 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
154. 463 U.S. 277, 293 (1983).
155. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. 173, 181 (E.D.N.Y.
1990), affd, 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting the lack of relationship between the value of
property and the harmfulness of the use to which it is put).
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criminal in nature. Thus, courts should treat section 881(a)(7) as a crim-
inal statute subject to the Eighth Amendment.
B. Apply a Proportionality Standard to Forfeitures Under Section
881(a)(7)
If section 881(a)(7) is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny, a pro-
portionality standard should apply in order to limit the value and extent
of the property seized to the degree of wrongdoing or harm. The punish-
ment for section 881(a)(7) infractions should be limited by a reasonable
governmental showing of "damages," including the government's costs
in enforcing the forfeiture provisions. Alternatively, the value of the
drugs could be used as a "measuring stick." In any event, courts should
limit the extent of forfeiture, or decline to enforce a forfeiture proceeding,
where the value and extent of the forfeited object is clearly disproportion-
ate to the degree of wrongdoing. Additionally, in cases where a small
section of property is used to commit a felony, as in marijuana growing
cases, no greater an area than that used to facilitate the drug felony
should be seized. Using a proportionality standard of this type would
still preserve the effectiveness of section 881(a)(7), while eliminating
many of the unfair and excessively harsh forfeitures which have occurred
in the past.
C. Apply a "Direct Involvement" Standard to Section 881(a)(7)
Seizure of property should be limited to those cases where the prop-
erty owner was "directly involved" in the drug felony offense, eliminat-
ing the harsh results of applying section 881(a)(7) to innocent owners.
The requirement that the property itself, and not the owner, be the
"facilitator" of the drug felony, is clearly a historical remnant of in rem
proceedings and needs to be discarded. Unless a landowner is directly
involved in the applicable felony, 5 7 or affirmatively consents to and prof-
its by the felony, his or her property should not be forfeited.
Mere knowledge of a tenant's felonious activity is not enough of a
justification to seize the landowner's property. Nor is the failure to pre-
vent drug violations by tenants enough of a justification to support prop-
erty forfeiture. Only those owners who are "directly involved" in a drug
felony should be subject to section 881(a)(7).
Conclusion
As it is now written, interpreted, and applied, 21 U.S.C. § 88 l(a)(7),
though ostensibly civil by design, is actually criminal in nature, and
should be subject to Eighth Amendment protection. The statute is
157. This might be similar to the way a property is now considered to "facilitate" a drug
felony. See supra note 29.
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uniquely offensive to Eighth Amendment concerns and often forces inno-
cent landowners to suffer for the illegal conduct of their tenants.
Though drug abuse is certainly a problem which needs to be ad-
dressed, it must not be done in such a way as to flagrantly violate consti-
tutional safeguards. The Supreme Court, which once held that
"constitutional protections for the security of person and property
should be liberally construed,"1 58 now seems content to overlook impor-
tant constitutional protections as an expedient means for ending the
"War on Drugs." The proposal offered here provides a more reasonable
and constitutionally sound interpretation of the current drug forfeiture
laws.
158. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
